
Meta has warned that all options are on the table, including withdrawing WhatsApp from Canada, if Ottawa uses proposed powers in Bill C-22 to force the company to weaken or break end-to-end encryption.
Rachel Curran, Meta’s head of public policy for Canada, issued the warning ahead of her scheduled appearance on November 16, 2026, before the Canadian Senate’s Standing Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs. While Meta has not decided to leave the Canadian market, Curran made clear that compromising encryption is a strict corporate red line if the legislation becomes law without stronger protections.
The warning comes during a coordinated last-minute push in Ottawa by Meta, Apple, Google, Signal, and digital rights organizations to persuade senators to rewrite the bill before a final vote.
In interviews published on November 16 with National Post and The Globe and Mail, Curran said Meta would refuse any directive requiring it to alter WhatsApp’s encryption architecture.
“We’re not going to break or weaken encryption, specifically vis-a-vis services like WhatsApp,” Curran told the National Post, adding that “all options are on the table” if asked whether Meta would pull the service from Canada.
Speaking separately to The Globe and Mail, she reinforced that stance. “Our red line is this: We would not weaken, break, or undermine our encrypted services and put our users at risk,” she said. Curran also told Bloomberg that the legislation creates “a real possibility that both the security and the privacy of Canadian users of these systems is really undermined.”
At the center of the dispute is Bill C-22, formally titled the Lawful Access Act, 2026. Introduced in March 2026 by Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree, the legislation updates how Canadian police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service obtain digital evidence. It cleared the House of Commons on June 18 and passed second reading in the Senate on October 22 before advancing to committee review.
The bill divides its powers into two parts. Part 1 updates Criminal Code and intelligence production orders so investigators can obtain existing subscriber information and transmission records more quickly with court authorization. Meta has stated in its official policy position that it generally supports Part 1 because it relies on judicial oversight for records a company already holds.
The conflict centers on Part 2, which enacts the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act. Rather than simply requesting existing data, Part 2 empowers the Minister of Public Safety to issue confidential ministerial orders requiring electronic service providers to build or maintain technical capabilities for authorized interceptions, backed by gag rules prohibiting companies from disclosing those orders. Following House amendments in June, regulations under the bill could also require designated core providers to collect and store certain user metadata for up to six months.
Whether Part 2 could force Meta to compromise WhatsApp hinges on how end-to-end encryption works and how the bill defines technical limits. End-to-end encryption scrambles messages on the sender’s device so they can only be unlocked on the recipient’s device. Meta does not hold the digital keys to unlock those chats and cannot currently read them or hand readable contents to police.
After strong spring criticism, lawmakers amended Bill C-22 to state that providers do not have to decrypt information if they lack the keys and cannot be compelled to create a “systemic vulnerability” posing a credible risk of unauthorized access. However, according to the Government of Canada’s lawful access summary, that definition explicitly excludes individuals who are the subject of a legal authorization.
Legal scholars, including University of Ottawa internet law professor Michael Geist, note that this carve-out leaves room for targeted orders aimed at specific individuals under warrant. Cybersecurity researchers and messaging providers argue that targeted interception cannot be isolated in an end-to-end encrypted system. Enabling access for even one user requires rewriting software to weaken encryption or route messages through an interception point—creating a structural flaw that hackers or foreign intelligence agencies could discover and exploit against users worldwide.
Prime Minister Mark Carney’s government rejects claims that Bill C-22 enables mass surveillance or encryption backdoors. Minister Anandasangaree has argued that updated powers are necessary to combat cybercrime, child exploitation, and organized criminal networks, accusing large technology firms of spreading misinformation.
“Bill C-22 does not authorize indiscriminate surveillance and does not permit or compel companies to introduce systemic vulnerabilities or so-called ‘backdoors.’ Any claims suggesting otherwise are incorrect,” Simon Lafortune, a spokesperson for Minister Anandasangaree, told Bloomberg. Officials add that confidential ministerial orders are reviewed by Canada’s independent Intelligence Commissioner and do not replace judicial warrants required for interceptions.
Opposition extends across the technology and privacy sectors. Encrypted messaging app Signal has warned it will exit Canada if Bill C-22 passes unchanged, with vice president of strategy and global affairs Udbhav Tiwari scheduled to testify alongside Meta at the November 16 Senate hearing. Speaking on Michael Geist’s Law Bytes podcast, Tiwari said the June amendments failed to resolve threats to Signal’s privacy guarantees.
Apple told Bloomberg that while it appreciates earlier improvements, the current text would undermine its ability to provide encryption protections, while Google warned the bill risks creating a surveillance infrastructure that harms transparency. Swiss privacy provider Proton said the legislation makes Canadian expansion unworkable, and both the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Electronic Frontier Foundation warned that mandatory metadata retention and secret orders threaten constitutional privacy rights.
The standoff mirrors international encryption disputes. Curran pointed to Britain’s Investigatory Powers Act, where UK authorities sought access to encrypted cloud backups and Apple responded by withdrawing its Advanced Data Protection feature from British users rather than weaken security. In the United States, lawmakers have warned Ottawa that broad surveillance mandates could weaken cross-border cybersecurity and complicate bilateral data-sharing talks.
For everyday WhatsApp users in Canada, the UK, the US, and Europe, nothing changes today. Bill C-22 is not yet law, no ministerial order has been issued, and WhatsApp chats remain end-to-end encrypted. A service restriction would only become an active question if the bill receives royal assent and the Public Safety Minister serves Meta with a confidential order that the company concludes compromises its encryption.
If that standoff occurs, Meta could challenge an order in court, disable encrypted features, or restrict access for Canadian phone numbers—similar to August 2023, when Meta blocked news links on Facebook and Instagram in Canada over the Online News Act. Meta has not detailed how existing Canadian chat histories or international messaging would be handled in a hypothetical exit.
For now, the decision rests with the Canadian Senate. Following the November 16 testimony before the Senate national security committee, senators will decide whether to propose amendments narrowing Part 2’s ministerial powers before sending the bill back to the House of Commons. Until that process concludes, Meta’s warning remains a conditional threat rather than a confirmed exit.




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