
Britain is not prepared well enough for a major emergency that could disrupt several essential services at once, a House of Lords committee has warned. Its new report says the UK needs better national leadership, stronger protection for essential services and clearer emergency plans involving the Government, businesses and local communities.
The concern is that one serious incident could affect much more than the organisation or service directly hit. A power cut could disrupt telephone networks. Lost communications could affect payments and deliveries. Supply problems could make it harder for shops and hospitals to get essential goods.
Published on 16 November 2026, the House of Lords National Resilience Committee’s report, Are we ready? Building a culture of resilience (HL Paper 79), examines how well the UK prepares for emergencies. It covers cyberattacks, hostile activity by foreign states, extreme weather, supply-chain problems and failures affecting essential infrastructure. The report’s main warning is that these risks cannot be handled separately. Electricity, communications, transport, food and healthcare all depend on one another. A problem in one area can quickly affect others.
The committee is not predicting an imminent nationwide blackout, food shortage or communications shutdown. It is warning that the UK could struggle to manage a major emergency if several essential services failed together. It says current plans are too fragmented and are not tested often enough against this kind of situation. For example, electricity is needed to keep telecommunications equipment running. Businesses rely on digital systems to manage payments, stock and deliveries. Transport networks move food, medicines and other essential goods around the country.
An attack does not need to target every service directly to cause wider problems. Disrupting one system used by several organisations could affect their ability to operate, communicate and respond.
The committee points to the 2024 CrowdStrike outage as an example. A software failure disrupted services in aviation, healthcare and banking. It was not a cyberattack, but it showed how problems with widely used technology can affect many organisations at once. Artificial intelligence is also changing the threat landscape. The report refers to a warning from the Director-General of MI5 that AI is increasing the risks linked to cyberattacks and other hostile activity. The concern is that AI could make some threats faster, easier to carry out or harder to manage. The report does not say AI alone will cause a national emergency.
The committee wants the Government to plan for these connected risks. It also wants emergency exercises to test what happens when more than one essential service fails at the same time. The financial damage from cyberattacks is already significant. Research commissioned by the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) and carried out by KPMG estimated that a successful, significant cyberattack costs a UK business almost £195,000 on average. Using its model across the UK economy, the research estimated an annual cost of £14.7 billion, equal to around 0.5% of gross domestic product.
These figures are estimates, not a confirmed total of money lost by British businesses in one year. The research uses simplified scenarios and general assumptions to calculate the wider economic impact. DSIT describes the figures as indicative rather than definitive. Even with those limits, the research shows that cyberattacks can affect businesses well beyond the technology sector. A company may face recovery costs, lost income and disruption. If it supplies other businesses, those problems can spread through the supply chain.
The DSIT summary of the KPMG research explains the figures and how they were calculated. The National Cyber Security Centre’s (NCSC) Annual Review 2026 gives another indication of the pressure on UK organisations. Between 1 September 2025 and 31 August 2026, the NCSC received 1,831 reports of cyberattacks affecting organisations in different sectors. Its incident-management team provided support in 337 cases. Of those, 80 were classed as nationally significant.
The NCSC also sent 8,500 Early Warning notifications to organisations. These alerts highlighted events that suggested their systems might have been compromised, giving them an opportunity to investigate. They are not 8,500 confirmed successful attacks. These figures do not cover every cyberattack in the UK. They show the reports received and incidents handled by the NCSC, giving an indication of the work reaching the national cyber security authority.
The committee is also concerned about cyber activity targeting British military networks. Its report says more than 90,000 attempted cyberattacks were made against UK defence systems in a single year. The report links this figure to the Ministry of Defence’s June 2026 Defence Investment Plan. An earlier Ministry of Defence announcement in May 2025 described more than 90,000 sub-threshold attacks over the previous two years. These statements cover different periods and should not be treated as the same set of figures.
“Sub-threshold” means activity that does not individually reach the level of a major incident. However, the figures show the continuing pressure on military networks. The report also examines wider hostile activity, including threats to undersea cables, interference with infrastructure, activity carried out through proxy groups and attempts to undermine public confidence. Food supplies are another area of concern. The committee says a large share of the food reaching British shops depends on a small number of companies and distribution centres.
According to the report, nine companies supply 94.5% of British retail food through 131 distribution hubs. This figure comes from evidence given by Professor Tim Lang, Professor Emeritus of Food Policy at the University of London, during question 116 of the committee’s evidence sessions.
This does not mean those companies are about to fail or that one disruption would automatically empty supermarket shelves. It shows how much of the country’s food distribution depends on a relatively small number of businesses and facilities. The report also says some food commodities have only two or three days of stock in the system. Modern food distribution relies on keeping goods moving rather than storing large amounts for long periods.
This can make supply chains more efficient, but it leaves less room to deal with a prolonged disruption. A problem at a major distribution centre, along a transport route, at a supplier or in a stock-management system could affect other parts of the food chain. Professor Lang also warned that food production depends heavily on oil, gas and artificial fertilisers. Carbon dioxide is another important supply because it is used in food manufacturing, retail and fertiliser production. A shortage could affect several parts of the food chain at once.
The committee wants the Government to explain how food and water supplies would be maintained during a prolonged emergency. It recommends stronger domestic production, reserves of important supplies and more secure arrangements with international partners. Medicine supplies face similar risks because the UK depends heavily on overseas suppliers for medicines and the ingredients used to make them.
The report says the UK manufactures almost one quarter of its medicines. Around one third come from India and one third from the European Union. It also says that around half of active pharmaceutical ingredients come from China and half from India. Active pharmaceutical ingredients are the substances that give medicines their medical effect. They are needed to make finished medicines.
The committee highlights 6-aminopenicillanic acid, usually called 6-APA. This is an important starting material used to manufacture penicillin-class antibiotics. The report says around 90% of global 6-APA production takes place in China. It also says nearly 70% of sites producing antibiotic active pharmaceutical ingredients are in China and India. The UK has also lost its domestic fallback for this stage of penicillin production. The last relevant domestic plant closed in 2025.
This does not mean every antibiotic used in Britain is made overseas or that shortages are inevitable. The concern is that relying on a small number of countries could make supplies harder to secure if factories, transport routes or international trade were disrupted. Some safeguards already exist. The report says suppliers on NHS England’s medicines procurement frameworks must hold an eight-week buffer of secondary-care medicines. However, these arrangements do not cover every secondary-care medicine, and not all suppliers comply yet. Separate stockpiles are also held for pandemic preparedness.
The committee wants the Government to review whether current stocks and supplier reserves would be enough during a prolonged emergency. It also recommends investment in UK production of essential medicines and ingredients, including 6-APA, and closer work with international partners to reduce reliance on a limited number of suppliers.
The report also warns that electricity failures could affect telephone and internet services. During evidence to the committee on 25 June 2026, Sophie Greaves, Associate Director for Digital Infrastructure at techUK, explained how closely the two services depend on each other. She told the committee: “if there is no electricity, there is no network”.
Telephone and internet networks need power to operate. Network operators have backup systems, but those systems have limits and must be maintained during an emergency.
Alex Towers, BT Group’s Director of Policy and Public Affairs, described BT’s backup arrangements during the same hearing. He said BT had around 5,000 generators across the BT and Openreach network. He also said the core network supporting broadband and mobile services had seven days of backup power.
Towers separately said that roadside street cabinets, the green boxes commonly seen on pavements, had around four hours of built-in battery backup.
These figures describe the arrangements Towers gave to the committee. The four-hour figure applies to the street cabinets he discussed. It does not apply to every telephone exchange, mobile mast or part of the national network. The seven-day figure was his description of BT’s core network arrangements, not an independent assessment of every service or the entire UK telecommunications system.
Towers also said many mobile masts had their own battery or generator backup. Services supporting emergency services and 999 had additional protection.
BT has an emergency response team that can deploy temporary equipment when infrastructure is damaged. Towers gave an example of satellite connectivity being used to provide a temporary service after a cable problem on a Scottish island.
Even so, he questioned whether the UK had enough backup capacity to deal with a much wider emergency. The committee is concerned that local equipment could lose power even while other parts of the network remain operational. This could leave communities with limited access to telephone and internet services.
The full 25 June 2026 evidence session includes evidence from Greaves, Towers and Rhodri Talfan Davies, the BBC’s Deputy Director-General.
Undersea cables are also important because they carry most of the data traffic between countries. Businesses, banks, government organisations and ordinary internet users all depend on them.
The committee heard concerns about how quickly damaged cables could be repaired. Towers told peers that BT had access to two cable repair ships. One was French-owned, based in France and usually busy elsewhere in Europe. The other was based in the UK but was 35 years old.
He questioned whether two ships would provide enough repair capacity for the coming decade, particularly if cables were damaged accidentally, became worn out or were deliberately targeted.
Greaves told the committee that around 70% to 80% of subsea cable breaks were accidental, while roughly one-third were not. She said the UK needed a closer, long-term partnership between the Government and industry to improve its repair capability.
This evidence does not mean several cables are about to be attacked at once. It raises a practical question: how quickly could the UK repair damaged cables if several incidents happened or a repair ship was unavailable?
The committee recommends that the Government work with the telecommunications industry on plans for widespread power cuts and subsea cable disruption. It also wants legislation to put proposals from the Government’s October 2026 White Paper on Critical Undersea Infrastructure Security and Resilience into effect.
The report also examines the move from traditional landlines to digital telephone services.
The Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) carries older analogue telephone services. It is being replaced by digital services. The official deadline for moving users of Openreach’s PSTN services is 31 January 2027.
The change will replace ageing technology that is becoming harder to maintain. Digital telephone services can be more reliable, but they need electricity and a working broadband connection.
This could create problems for people who rely on telecare equipment, medical alarms or landlines because mobile coverage is poor. If the digital service loses power or its internet connection, equipment that depends on it may stop working too.
There are safeguards and arrangements to help people move to digital services. However, people should not assume every device will work automatically after the change.
The Government’s telecare and digital switchover guidance explains what housing providers and other organisations should do to protect telecare users.
Anyone who depends on a medical alarm or telecare service should check with their telephone provider, telecare supplier or care provider. They should confirm that their equipment will work after the switch and during a power cut.
People also need reliable ways to receive information during an emergency, even if telephone and internet services are unavailable.
During the June evidence session, BBC Deputy Director-General Rhodri Talfan Davies discussed the importance of trusted information during national emergencies. The committee also heard from the Cabinet Office that arrangements exist with broadcasters to provide emergency broadcasts when power is absent.
Radio remains important because battery-powered and wind-up radios can receive updates without home broadband. The Government’s Be Ready guidance recommends keeping a battery-powered or wind-up FM radio at home.
The committee is also concerned about plans to switch off Digital Terrestrial Television, commonly known as Freeview. It recommends that the Government abandon the plan because terrestrial television remains an important way for people to receive information, particularly if internet services fail.
This is a recommendation from the committee. The Government has not already accepted it. The concern is whether people will still be able to receive reliable information if digital networks become unavailable.
The committee also questions whether the Government has clear enough responsibility and leadership for national emergency planning.
It says responsibility is spread across different departments and organisations. This can make it harder to ensure that their plans work together. A department may understand the risks in its own area, but an emergency affecting several sectors needs a coordinated response.
The committee recommends appointing a Cabinet minister whose sole responsibility would be national resilience. It also wants a Chief Resilience Officer at Permanent Secretary level and one national resilience strategy with clear responsibilities, shared standards and measurable targets.
It proposes that the Prime Minister make an annual statement to Parliament about the UK’s state of preparedness. It also wants every government department to appoint a senior official responsible for preparedness and security.
Dame Angela Eagle MP was Minister of State for Security when she gave evidence to the committee on 16 July 2026. She defended the Government’s existing approach, which shares responsibility across departments and uses the Cabinet Office and national security arrangements to coordinate their work.
She argued that risks are connected and that departments should remain responsible for the areas they understand. She told the committee:
“In some ways, the paradox of your question, wanting to have a Minister only for resilience, was disproved by the earlier bits of your question when you were saying that the risks are changing, morphing and becoming interconnected”.
Her evidence makes clear that a dedicated resilience minister is the committee’s recommendation, not an existing Government commitment. The disagreement is over whether a separate minister would improve coordination or separate resilience work from the departments responsible for managing individual risks.
The full 16 July 2026 evidence session records Eagle’s comments and evidence from Roger Hargreaves, Director of the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat.
National emergency plans also need to work at local level. In England and Wales, Local Resilience Forums bring together organisations such as councils, emergency services and NHS bodies. They help these organisations prepare for and respond to major local emergencies.
The committee says these forums need clearer responsibilities, more reliable funding and stronger accountability. It recommends giving them a statutory role and creating regional coordination centres to connect national decisions with local action.
The Government has already started work in this area. Its 2026 Resilience Action Plan implementation report describes the Stronger LRF Trailblazers programme, which introduced Chief Resilience Officers in five participating areas.
This is a step towards stronger local leadership. However, it does not mean the Government has accepted the committee’s wider proposals to give all Local Resilience Forums statutory status and long-term funding.
The committee also wants local emergency plans to identify people who may need extra help. This includes people who cannot easily travel to collect supplies, people who rely on medical equipment and those who may not receive online warnings.
Businesses must also be involved because private companies operate much of the infrastructure and supply chains the UK depends on.
The committee notes evidence that more than 80% of the UK’s critical national infrastructure is privately owned and maintained. It recommends clearer and proportionate requirements for businesses, especially those providing essential services or supporting important supply chains.
It also wants regular emergency tests across critical sectors, including food, energy, water and medicines. These tests would examine how businesses and services would continue operating if several important services became unavailable together.
For example, a business could test what it would do if its main supplier, payment provider and communications service all stopped working at the same time. The aim is to find weaknesses before a real emergency exposes them.
Cyber insurance is another issue raised in the report. The Association of British Insurers told the committee that its members paid £197 million to help businesses recover from cyber incidents in 2024. This was a 230% increase on the previous year.
The report also cites Government data indicating that 50% of UK small and medium-sized businesses faced a cyberattack in 2025.
The committee heard a claim from Howden that 60% of small and medium-sized businesses without cyber insurance go bankrupt within six months of a severe incident. This was evidence submitted to the inquiry, not a finding confirmed by the committee. It should not be treated as a reliable prediction for an individual business.
Insurance can help businesses cover some costs after an incident. However, it cannot prevent an attack or guarantee that a company will keep operating.
The committee wants the Government to examine whether public and private insurance arrangements could help businesses deal with risks that are too expensive or difficult for commercial insurers to cover alone.
Smaller businesses also have access to practical cyber security support. On 3 November 2026, the Government announced a Cyber Essentials funding package.
Eligible small and medium-sized businesses applying for their first Cyber Essentials certificate can receive a 75% discount. Selected suppliers in participating supply chains may qualify for fully funded certification and support from a Cyber Advisor.
Cyber Essentials covers basic protections against common online threats. Businesses can also improve security by using multi-factor authentication, installing software updates, keeping secure backups and checking the security arrangements of important suppliers.
The committee welcomes the Government’s Be Ready campaign, which asks people to prepare for three days of disruption. However, it says public preparedness cannot rely on an online information page alone. A major emergency could affect electricity and internet access.
The Government’s official Be Ready guidance recommends that households consider keeping:
- Drinking water, allowing three litres per person per day, with extra water for cooking and washing.
- Non-perishable food that will last for three days.
- A torch and spare batteries.
- A battery-powered or wind-up FM radio.
- A charged power bank.
- Essential medicines and basic first-aid supplies.
- Some cash, including coins and notes, in case card payments or cash machines are unavailable.
- Written copies of important phone numbers and key information.
The guidance also asks people to consider the needs of children, older relatives, people with medical requirements and pets. It recommends building up supplies gradually instead of buying everything at once.
People who may need extra help during an outage can check whether they qualify for the Priority Services Register with their electricity, gas or water provider. The register helps providers identify customers who may need additional support during a disruption.
The committee recognises that not everyone has the money, space or ability to prepare in the same way.
Its chair, Baroness Coussins, made this point in an article for The Guardian on 16 November. She described a single parent on a low income living in a tower block without a working lift. Her point was that telling people to store supplies does not solve the problems faced by those who cannot easily do so.
She argues that households should not be left to prepare on their own. Councils, community organisations and voluntary groups also need the resources and plans to help people who cannot prepare independently.
The committee recommends sending a practical preparedness booklet to every household and creating a multilingual emergency app. It also wants local organisations to identify people who may need help and plan how to deliver essential supplies during an emergency.
The report contains recommendations, not policies that the Government has already agreed to introduce.
At the time of publication, the committee’s publications and responses register listed the new report, but did not show a separate formal Government response to it.
Some other work is already under way. During the July evidence session, the Government confirmed plans for an exercise in 2027 to practise the response to an attack on the UK homeland. This is part of wider work to test how the Government and other organisations would respond to serious threats.
The Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill is also moving through Parliament. It completed its House of Lords third reading on 2 November 2026 and is due to return to the House of Commons for consideration of Lords amendments on 24 November.
The Bill aims to strengthen security and resilience requirements for organisations providing essential services and other activities covered by the legislation. It has not yet become law. It is also a separate process from the committee’s recommendations.
The committee’s official announcement on 16 November sets out its main concerns and calls for urgent action.
For households, the immediate message is not to expect a nationwide emergency. It is to understand the official advice, think about what everyone at home might need and check whether essential equipment, medicines and communication arrangements would work during a power cut or other disruption.
For businesses, the report is a reminder that resilience means more than protecting computers. Companies also need to know which suppliers and services they depend on, keep secure backups and make sure staff know what to do when normal operations stop.
The Government and the organisations running essential services have the wider responsibility. Britain already has emergency plans, specialist response teams and backup systems. The question is whether they can work together when several parts of the country are affected at the same time.
The committee wants the UK to test and improve its emergency plans before a crisis happens. Its message is that national resilience should be judged by whether essential services keep working and people can get the help and information they need when disruption strikes.




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